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THE LADIES? FORGET ABOUT THEM. A
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON THE LIMITS
OF ORIGINALISM
Mary Anne Case ∗
One hundred years ago, in An Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States, Charles Beard asked of the
Framers:
Did they represent distinct groups whose economic interests
they understood and felt in concrete, definite form through
their own personal experience with identical property rights, or
were they working merely under the guidance of abstract
1
principles of political science?

Beard examined the Framers’ investments in, among other
things, public securities, western lands, shipping and
2
manufactures, but he did not consider in any detail the possible
influence of their personal experience as members of the distinct
group of males who had an economic interest, through the laws of
coverture, in the labor and property of the women in their
3
families. Yet the Framers of both the original Constitution and
∗ Arnold I. Shure Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. This essay
was developed in part as my contribution to three conferences: Originalism 2.0, the 2010
Federalist Society National Student Symposium on Law and Public Policy; the 2009
University of Chicago-Loyola University Law School Symposium: Slavery, Abolition, and
Human Rights; and the University of Virginia Miller Center Symposium to Mark the 100th
Anniversary of Charles Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. A version
was presented at the NYU Legal History Colloquium. I am grateful to the organizers of
these events, particularly Jessica Lowe and Bill Nelson, for their invitation and advice; to
commentator Ted White; fellow panelists John Harrison and Keith Whittington; my editor
Dale Carpenter, Will Baude, Dick Fallon, Dirk Hartog, Daniel Hulsebosch, Andy
Koppelman, Pnina Lahav, Amy Dru Stanley, and Lea VanderVelde for comments on
drafts; David Bell, Richard Bernstein, Frank Easterbrook, Dick Helmholtz, Sarah
MacDougall, Eric Posner, Adam Samaha, Paul Stephan, and David Strauss for
brainstorming and bibliographic assistance; the Kanter fund for support; and Lyo LouisJacques and Deborah Megdal for research assistance.
1. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 73 (1913).
2. Id.
3. Had he considered their economic interest as males, Beard would have been able
to raise even above his estimate of “five sixths” the “overwhelming majority of members
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the post-Civil War Amendments were quite conscious of their
interests in preserving their male prerogatives in law. Repeatedly
and explicitly asked, as John Adams was by his wife Abigail, to
“[r]emember the ladies . . . in the new Code of Laws which I
suppose it will be necessary for you to make, . . . and be more
4
generous and favourable to them than your ancestors,” the
Framers deliberately rejected the demand that they “not put such
5
unlimited power into the hands of the Husbands.” Asked to
6
“[r]emember, all Men would be tyrants if they could,” they did
not simply forget about the ladies; they specifically and
intentionally determined to exclude them and to confirm men’s
7
tyrannical power. But, far from acknowledging this as a naked
power grab, they could claim to justify women’s exclusion “under
the guidance of abstract principles of political science.” In
particular, they could rely on a notion, common in the eighteenth
century, that it would upset the balance of power to give women,
who already were in a position to exert powerful indirect
influence on and through their men from within the household, a
more direct voice in public affairs. As Abigail Adams described
this view, “It would be bad policy to grant us greater power say
they since under all the disadvantages we Labour we have the
8
as[c]endancy over their Hearts [a]nd. . .by submitting sway.”
Thus, the disenfranchisement of women could be characterized as
a principled decision about the allocation of power and the locus
at which power is exercised in the same way as might, for example,
the construction of the Senate, federalism, or the separation of
[who were] immediately, directly, and personally interested in the outcome of their labors
at Philadelphia, and were to a greater or less extent economic beneficiaries from the
adoption of the Constitution.” Id. at 149.
4. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776), in THE BOOK OF
ABIGAIL AND JOHN, SELECTED LETTERS OF THE ADAMS FAMILY 1762-1784, at 121 (L.H.
Butterfield et al. eds., 1975).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. More than the Adams correspondence demonstrates that it is “not anachronistic”
to consider that the Framers “explicitly denied . . . women entry into the new political
regime.” See, e.g., LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES:
WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 9 (1998) (quoting James Otis asking if
“all were reduced to a state of nature . . . had not apple women and orange girls as good a
right to give their respectable suffrage for a new King as the philosopher . . . ?”). And other
reasons than John Adams’s, discussed infra, were given for excluding them. See, e.g., Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (Sept. 5, 1816), as quoted in United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532, n.5 (“Were our State a pure democracy . . . there would yet be
excluded from their deliberations . . . women, who, to prevent depravation of morals and
ambiguity of issue, could not mix promiscuously in the public meetings of men.”).
8. Letter from Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, (Apr. 27, 1776), (available at
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/ADMS-04-01-02-0257) (summarizing John
Adams’s response to Abigail’s letter insisting that the ladies be remembered).
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powers, each of which also could be seen to serve sectarian
interests.
My article will consider the offered justifications in their
historical context and some possible responses to them. Like
Beard’s history itself, “[t]he following pages are frankly
fragmentary. They are designed to suggest new lines of . . .
research rather than to treat the subject in an exhaustive
9
fashion.” But my motive for wanting to take up this project at this
time has less to do with Beard and the past than with my concerns
10
about the constitutional future of sex discrimination at a time
11
when voices as seemingly disparate as Justice Antonin Scalia and
12
Roberta Kaplan, attorney for DOMA plaintiff Edith Windsor,
disparage the need for heightened scrutiny for sex discrimination
without taking any account of women’s specifically intended
historical exclusion and its lingering after-effects. The article will
therefore conclude with an examination of the limits of
originalism, not only for women and their rights, but for
constitutional adjudication more generally.

9. BEARD, supra note 1, at v. This essay is also fragmentary in another sense—it
cannot pretend to do justice to the volumes of primary and secondary sources that have
already cogently addressed the limitations of the Constitution and its Framers when it
comes to issues concerning women and sex equality, although it will cite a far from
exhaustive subset of such works.
10. As Barack Obama put it in a different context, “I didn’t come here to debate the
past. I came here to deal with the future.” Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Alexei Barrionuevo,
Obama Says U.S. Will Pursue Thaw With Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009.
11. See infra note 65.
12. In her oral argument before the Second Circuit in United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675 (2013), Kaplan observed, “we believe that . . . being gay or lesbian is closest to
being an African American than it is to being – I hate to get so personal about this, than
being a woman, because there is nothing about being gay or lesbian that has anything to
do with an individual’s ability to perform in society and that’s essentially what I believe the
courts are looking at, that’s the first factor, I believe it is the most important factor.
Whereas, for women, and I’m obviously a member of that class, there are obviously things,
we get pregnant, we are not as strong, there is the firemen cases things like that, where
there could be some kind of differentiation by the legislature that would make sense. With
respect to gay and lesbian people, it is very hard if not impossible to conceive of any such
differentiation.” In context, ironically, Kaplan’s repudiation of constitutional antistereotyping doctrine for sex-based classifications did not serve her client’s cause well,
because it allowed Second Circuit Chief Judge Jacobs immediately to point out that gays
and lesbians in same-sex couples could indeed be viewed as differently situated with
respect to their ability to procreate. Cert. petition in United States v. Windsor, 2012 U.S.
Briefs 59493 at *a26.
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THE TYRANNY OF MEN VS. THE DESPOTISM OF THE
PETTICOAT
When Beard does discuss women, he lumps them together
with slaves, indentured servants, and propertyless men among
“the disfranchised” who were “not represented in the Convention
that drafted the Constitution except under the theory that
13
representation has no relation to voting.” Yet the evidence he
presents as to the sources of the Framers’ wealth suggests that a
considerable number of them had married heiresses or stemmed
from families whose wealth was traceable chiefly from the
14
maternal line. This alone would give these Framers a direct
personal incentive to “insist upon retaining an absolute power
15
over Wives” and their property, despite Abigail Adams’s desires

13. BEARD, supra note 1, at 24.
14. See id. at 75-76 (“Richard Bassett, of Delaware . . . was the adopted son of Mr.
Lawson, a lawyer, who married a Miss Inzer. The Inzer family was . . . heir to Bohemia
Manor. . . . Mr. Bassett was educated and trained for the profession of law by Mr. Lawson,
whose heir he became. By this inheritance he came into possession of six thousand acres
of Bohemia manor.”); id. at 82-83 (“George Clymer, of Pennsylvania, was the son of ‘a
well-to-do merchant and ship builder of Philadelphia’ who had augmented his fortunes by
marrying the daughter of a fellow merchant of the same city. . . . Clymer’s personal fortune
was further enhanced by a happy marriage to Elizabeth Meredith, the daughter of Reese
Meredith, ‘one of the principal merchants of Philadelphia.’”); id. at 87 (Had John
Dickinson’s “personal fortunes . . . not been sufficient . . ., his marriage into one of the first
and wealthiest commercial families would have more than made up for his deficiencies. In
1770 he married Mary Norris, and for a time lived at the family estate, Fairhill, one of the
show places of the day.”); id. at 88-90 (“Though [Oliver Ellsworth] was almost briefless
during the early days of his practice, he had the good fortune to wed the daughter of
William Wolcott, of East Windsor, ‘a gentleman of substance and distinction.’”); id. at 91
(Thomas Fitzsimons “married the daughter of Robert Meade, and established business
relations with his brother-in-law ‘who was one of the prominent merchants and shipowners
of Philadelphia.’”); id. at 117 (William Samuel Johnson “added to his own patrimony by
marrying the daughter of a ‘wealthy gentleman’ of Stratford.”); id. at 119 (“Rufus King
was also fortunate in his marriage . . . . his wife ‘was the only child of Mr. John Alsop, a
very respectable and eminent merchant in [New York]’”); id. at 124 (William Livingston
“married Miss French, ‘whose father had been a large proprietor of land in New Jersey.’”);
id. at 127 (George Mason “married the daughter of a Maryland merchant, from whom a
large estate came into his family.”); id. at 148 (George Wythe’s “second wife ‘was a lady of
a wealthy and respectable family of Taliafero, residing near Williamsburg.’”). As Mary
Ritter Beard points out, Blackstone, whose exaggerated description of wives’ legal
subjection to husbands was eagerly embraced by Americans, also profited from family ties
to wealthy women. See MARY RITTER BEARD, WOMAN AS FORCE IN HISTORY: A STUDY
IN TRADITIONS AND REALITIES 91 (1946) (describing Blackstone as a tradesman’s son
whose mother and wife were from the landed gentry, through which family connections he
obtained a legal education and a country seat to house him when he failed at law practice).
15. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (May 7, 1776), in THE BOOK OF
ABIGAIL AND JOHN, supra note 4, at 127 (“I can not say that I think you are very generous
to the Ladies, for whilst you are proclaiming peace and good will to Men, Emancipating
all Nations, you insist upon retaining an absolute power over Wives”).
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to the contrary. 16 Abigail observed of John’s unwillingness to
“[e]stablish. . . some Laws in [women’s] favour upon just and
Liberal principals” what Beard documented with respect to the
Framers more generally: “I have . . . been making trial of the
Disintresstedness of his Virtue, and when weighd in the balance
17
have found it wanting.”
Like Beard, John Adams, in his response to Abigail, lumps
women with the rest of the disenfranchised:
As to your extraordinary Code of Laws, I cannot but laugh. We
have been told that our Struggle has loosened the bonds of
Government every where. That Children and Apprentices
were disobedient—that schools and Colleges were grown
turbulent—that Indians slighted their Guardians and Negroes
grew insolent to their Masters. But your Letter was the first
Intimation that another Tribe more numerous and powerfull
than all the rest, were grown discontented.—This is rather too
coarse a Compliment, but you are so saucy, I wont blot it out.
Depend upon it, We know better than to repeal our Masculine
systems. Altho they are in full Force, you know they are little
more than Theory. We dare not exert our Power in its full
Latitude. We are obliged to go fair, and softly, and in Practice
you know We are the subjects. We have only the Name of
Masters, and rather than give up this, which would compleatly
subject Us to the Despotism of the Peticoat, I hope General
18
Washington, and all our brave Heroes would fight.

For John Adams to equate discontented women with insolent
Negroes might suggest to a modern audience that the decision not
“to repeal our masculine systems” is no more than a naked power
19
grab by what Abigail Adams called a “sex naturally tyrannical.”
But, in the late eighteenth century, his expressed concern about a
16. Abigail never ceased to press John on this score. Years after first asking him to
“remember the Ladies,” she wrote, “Even in the freeest countrys our property is subject
to the controul and disposal of our partners, to whom the Laws have given a soverign
Authority. Deprived of a voice in Legislation, obliged to submit to those Laws which are
imposed upon us, is it not sufficient to make us indifferent to the publick Welfare?” Letter
from Abigail Adams to John Adams (June 17, 1782), in 4 ADAMS FAMILY
CORRESPONDENCE 328 (L.H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1973).
17. Letter from Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, supra note 8.
18. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Apr. 14, 1776), in THE BOOK OF
ABIGAIL AND JOHN, supra note 4, at 122-23. Laughter was an all too common response to
women’s rights claims. See Mary Anne Case, From the Mirror of Reason to the Measure of
Justice, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 115 (1993) (situating in historical context the laughter that
greeted Representative Smith’s introduction of a prohibition against sex discrimination
into the text of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
19. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams, supra note 4, at 121 (“That your Sex
are Naturally Tyrannical is a Truth so thoroughly established as to admit of no dispute”).
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possible “Despotism of the Peticoat” would have resonated
instead with concerns about the separation of and balance of
powers between men and women and between their respective
20
spheres. As Mary Beth Norton describes it, the term “Petticoat
Government,” used as the title of a 1702 pamphlet by John
Dunton, editor of the Athenian Mercury, on the accession of
Queen Anne to the British throne, originates in a time of
transition from mid-seventeenth century Anglo-America, when
“high social status rather than gender identified the appropriate
21
wielders of power in both household and state,” to the prerevolutionary eighteenth century, which increasingly defined all
women out of public life into a private sphere. “Dunton began by
praising women in general, denying any sexual difference in minds
22
or souls,” but went on to endorse rigidly separate spheres, with
a man’s province being the “out of doors” or public sphere and
that of a woman who was not a hereditary monarch being “the
Discreet and Housewifely Ruling of a House” where “her very
23
Husband lives under Petticoat-Government.”
It was the French rather than the American revolutionaries
who were most alive to the risk of the “despotism of the
petticoat.” The sentiment that politically powerful women did
more harm than good was well-nigh universal in a country with a
vivid memory of inept female regents (from the two Medicis to
Anne of Austria), interfering royal mistresses (from Maintenon
and Pompadour to DuBarry, who was guillotined for her crimes),
ambitious court intriguantes (from the frondières to the Comtesse
de Polignac) and a network of intellectuals, artists and officials
24
entirely dependent on the whims of fashionable women.
Women’s extravagance could be blamed for the bankruptcy of
France, their scheming for ruinous foreign policy, their patronage
20. Cf. LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC 200 (2000) (noting that in the
early republic, “[m]otherhood was discussed almost as if it were a fourth branch of
government”).
21. MARY BETH NORTON, SEPARATED BY THEIR SEX: WOMEN IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE IN THE COLONIAL ATLANTIC WORLD, at xiv (2011).
22. Id. at 101.
23. Id. at 102 (quoting JOHN DUNTON, PETTICOAT GOVERNMENT 97 (1702)).
24. See, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, PERSIAN LETTERS 197 (C.J. Betts, ed. & trans.,
Penguin 1973) (1721) at 197 (Letter 107, Rica to Ibben) (“[F]or every man who has any
post at court, in Paris, or in the country, there is a woman through whose hands pass all the
favours and sometimes the injustices that he does. These women are all in touch with one
another, and compose a sort of commonwealth whose members are always busy giving
each other mutual help and support. It is like another state within the state, and a man who
watches the actions of ministers, officials, or prelates at court, in Paris, or in the country,
without knowing the women who rule them, is like a man who can see a machine in action
but does not know what makes it work”).
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for the appointment of the inept and corrupt, their control over
25
cultural life for the effeminacy of the French nation. The
embodiment of all these evils was Marie Antoinette. There was a
widespread view that upper-class women, whose exercise of secret
power was associated with some of the worst excesses of the Old
Regime, had to be purged from the system if it was to have a hope
of avoiding corruption. As for the mobs of lower class women,
they could be excluded from political rights on much the same
theory as were the “children, the insane, and the infamous” with
26
whom they were so often lumped —the theory that a rational
political system demands rational, informed, responsible
27
participants. As a result, French women, who had been voters
from the time of Philip the Fair in the 14th century and who had
participated in voting for the Estates General of 1789 on terms
28
nearly equal to those of men, were denied all voting rights in the
Revolution and did not regain them until 1946.
While anti-feminist French legislators took from their history
the desirability of women’s permanent exclusion from political
life and power, French feminists like Marie Olympe de Gouges
25. Although he balances the catalogue with examples of males influenced by private
passion quite apart from any female influence, Alexander Hamilton’s account of the
baleful influence of women who “abused the confidence they possessed” is much like that
of the French. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 6, Concerning Dangers from Dissensions
Between the States, Independent Journal, Wednesday, Nov. 14, 1787 (“Pericles, in
compliance with the resentment of a prostitute, at the expense of much of the . . . treasure
of his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the Samnians. . . . The
influence which the bigotry of one female [Madame de Maintenon], the petulance of
another [Duchess of Marlborough], and the cabals of a third [Madame de Pompadour],
had in the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of
Europe, are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known”).
26. Archives Parlementaires 29 April 1793, report of Languinas p. 562.
27. For further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, “La Révolution n’a rien fait pour
les pauvres femmes”: The Rhetoric and Reality of Political Rights for Women in the
French Revolution (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). I was delighted to
have the opportunity, in returning to the University of Virginia for the Beard Conference,
to pursue themes I first voiced there in my 1990 job talk for the University of Virginia
School of Law.
28. The regulations governing the convocation of the Estates General of 1789
explicitly gave noble females with fiefs and communities of religious women the right to
name proxies to represent them. For the Third Estate, the regulations called for
participation by all inhabitants on the tax rolls of cities and other communities, assembled
by corporation, with those not belonging to a corporation or similar body electing separate
delegates. There was substantial regional variation in the interpretation of this
requirement, including the extent to which women were meant to participate. In general
practice, however, the unit of participation seems to have been, not the individual, but the
hearth and almost all the numerous women recorded as participating in local assemblies
are described as “widows” or unmarried “girls maintaining their own hearths.”
Occasionally, however, married women with substantial property in their own name
appear to have sent their husbands as their proxies. For further elaboration, see LÉON
ABENSOUR, LA FEMME ET LE FÉMINISME AVANT LA REVOLUTION 325-52 (1923).
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instead argued that women’s corrupt misrule would end only
when they are better educated, are given job opportunities that
do not involve the sale of their sexual favors, and have direct
rather than devious access to power. De Gouges saw the best hope
for improvement in the passage of laws providing for women to
be educated and “to join in all the activities of men. If man insists
on finding this means impracticable, let him share his fortune with
woman, not according to his whim, but according to the wisdom
29
of the law.”
Just as Olympe de Gouges’s demand for a legally mandated
sharing of power and property between the sexes resonates with
that of Abigail Adams, the French revolutionary notion that
women already had so much power in the home and in society
that they couldn’t be afforded any power in the state, that it would
upset the balance of power to give them political rights, is
consistent with John Adams’s expressed view that men were
already their wives’ subjects and would be victims of petticoat
despotism if they yielded further.
THE LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE OF
UNENFRANCHISED WOMEN
A much more benign view of women’s behind-the-scenes
influence on politics comes through in Mary Ritter Beard’s essay
30
The Legislative Influence of Unenfranchised Women, published
a year after her husband’s Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution and six years before the ratification of the
Nineteenth Amendment, in the midst of a campaign for woman
31
suffrage in which she was an active participant. She contrasts two

29. MARIE OLYMPE DE GOUGES, DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN AND
FEMALE CITIZEN (1791). Among the laws for improving the financial aspects of
relations between the sexes De Gouges proposed were ones mandating equal inheritance,
indemnities for seduced and abandoned women, rights for the illegitimate to “the name
and property of the father,” community of property in marriage, and equal division in case
of divorce. She further favored laws providing for termination of marriages at will, clerical
marriage, and the restriction of prostitutes to designated quarters. None of these proposals
was outrageous for its time. Indeed, many were enacted by the Revolutionary legislature.
But Olympe de Gouges herself was guillotined, a fact which may cast in a darker light John
Adams’s apparently flip insistence that male prerogatives should be defended by force if
necessary. For further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, Olympe de Gouges: “Foremother”
of Feminists? Or their Heir? (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
30. MARY RITTER BEARD, The Legislative Influence of Unenfranchised Women, 56
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 54 (1914), reprinted in MARY RITTER BEARD, A
SOURCEBOOK 89-94 (Ann J. Lane ed., 1977).
31. Mary Ritter Beard worked both ends of the suffrage campaign, giving a
Statement to the House Committee on Woman Suffrage and campaigning to win over
THE
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forces behind “invisible government”: the malign force of
“powerful economic interests, organized and always alert” and
32
the “beneficent influences . . . of voteless women.”
With respect to those women powerful enough to engage in
“statesmanlike wire-pulling, . . . organized efforts of women for
the accomplishment of definite programs; lobbies in legislative
chambers . . . and cooperation with men in organized legislative
33
effort,” Mary Ritter Beard seems to imagine them nearly exempt
from the pursuit of self-interest her husband looked for in the
Framers. All the issues with respect to which she lists these
women as exerting influence, with the exception of “legislation
34
dealing with their own enfranchisement,” involve “local
improvements of one kind or another” or “the progress of modern
35
social legislation of all kinds.” Yet, in urging “Votes for
Workingwomen,” Mary Ritter Beard stressed “they need the vote
for what it can do for them” on issues including “[t]he white slave
traffic, mothers’ pensions, unemployment, education, child labor”
and a host of others she enumerated “which vitally affect
workingwomen and will never be dealt with to their advantage
until they make themselves felt as human beings with minds and
36
hearts.” And she found it “interesting to note that those women
most actively using indirect influence are coming to prefer direct
37
action on their own account.”
FREEING THE SLAVES, BUT NOT A MAN’S WIFE AND
DAUGHTERS
Just as Charles Beard mentions, but does not analyze in
detail, the financial incentives the Framers might have had for
opposing either political power for their wives and mothers or a
reform of the laws of coverture as proposed by Abigail Adams, he
also mentions, but does not analyze, their possible financial stake
in denying political power and legal rights to their unmarried
daughters. Beard notes that

working class men. See MARY RITTER BEARD, Statement to the House Committee on
Woman Suffrage, in MARY RITTER BEARD, A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 100.
32. RITTER BEARD, The Legislative Influence, supra note 30, at 89-90.
33. Id. at 90.
34. Id. at 91.
35. Id. at 93.
36. MARY RITTER BEARD, Votes for Workingwomen, 3 WOMAN VOTER 3 (1912),
reprinted in MARY RITTER BEARD, A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 30, at 80, 84.
37. RITTER BEARD, The Legislative Influence, supra note 30, at 94.
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Hamilton in his report on manufactures . . . observes that one
of the advantages of the extensive introduction of machinery
will be “the employment of persons who would otherwise be
idle, and in many cases, a burthen on the community, either
from bias of temper, habit, infirmity of body, or some other
cause, indisposing or disqualifying them for the toils of the
country. It is worthy of remark, that, in general, women and
children are rendered more useful, and the latter more early
useful, by manufacturing establishments, than they would
otherwise be. Of the number of persons employed in the cotton
manufactories of Great Britain, it is computed that foursevenths, nearly, are women and children; of whom the greatest
proportion are children, many of them of a tender age.”
Apparently this advantage was, in Hamilton’s view, to accrue
principally to the fathers of families, for he remarks: “The
husbandman himself experiences a new source of profit and
support, from the increased industry of his wife and daughters,
invited and stimulated by the demands of the neighboring
38
manufactories.”

Although Beard ends his economic history with the framing
of the original Constitution, it is worthy of note that, in the
debates around the framing of the post-Civil War Amendments,
the continued economic interests of the fathers of families in the
labor of their wives and daughters was front and center in debates
about the expected meaning of these Amendments. Thus, as Jill
Hasday observed, “congressmen on all sides of the debates over
the Fourteenth Amendment hoped that the amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause would not be read to disrupt common law
coverture or prohibit sex discrimination, even as their discussion
of the amendment made clear that such an interpretation of equal
39
protection was possible.” And, as Lea VanderVelde, among
others, has documented, whatever their inclinations with respect
to the abolition of Negro chattel slavery, congressmen were at
pains to insist “that the term ‘involuntary servitude’ not apply to
family relationships where the head of the household legally held
40
a property right in the services of other household members.”
Thus, for example, Chilton White of Ohio argued against
abolition and in favor of due process and compensation for slave
owners as follows:

38. BEARD, supra note 1, at 24-26.
39. Jill Elaine Hasday, Women’s Exclusion from the Constitutional Canon, 2013 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1715, 1719 (2013).
40. Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA.
L. REV. 437, 454 (1989).

8 - THE LADIES, FORGET ABOUT THEM (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

7/18/2014 9:45 AM

THE LADIES? FORGET ABOUT THEM.

441

The parent has the right to the service of his child; he has a
property in the service of that child. A husband has a right of
property in the service of his wife; he has the right to the
management of his household affairs . . . . All these rights rest
upon the same basis as a man’s right of property in the service
of slaves. The relation is clearly and distinctly defined by the
law, and as clearly and distinctly recognized by the Constitution
41
of the United States.

And, after ratification, Senator Edgar Cowan, “the primary
42
voice for a limited thirteenth amendment,” insisted:
Now . . . in all good faith, what was the meaning of that [phrase,
“involuntary servitude”]? What was its intent? Can there be
any doubt of it? . . . That amendment, everybody knows and
nobody dare deny, was simply made to liberate the negro slave
from his master. That is all there is of it. Will . . . anybody . . .
undertake to say that that was to prevent the involuntary
servitude of my child to me, of my apprentice to me, or the
quasi servitude which the wife to some extent owes to her
43
husband? Certainly not.

A POSSIBLE RESPONSE: SLAVERY IN THE OTHER
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 44
If one wanted to work within an originalist framework to
vindicate some of the rights of women as wives and daughters and
41. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 2D SESS. 215 (1865) (remarks of Rep. White),
quoted in VanderVelde, supra note 40, at 454-55.
42. VanderVelde, supra note 40, at 456.
43. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 499 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Cowan),
quoted in VanderVelde, supra note 40, at 457. Cowan later observed, “Nobody can pretend
that those things were within the purview of that amendment; nobody believes it. It was
mentioned as a matter of ridicule, in some places, that it did actually liberate the minor
from the control of his parent or guardian; that it did actually entitle the wife to be paid
for her own services, that they should not go to the husband; but that was false.” See CONG.
GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1784 (1866) (Civil Rights Bill) (remarks of Sen. Cowan),
quoted in VanderVelde, supra note 40, at n.93. According to VanderVelde “No
congressmen claimed the term should apply to wives or children.” VanderVelde, supra
note 40, at 457.
44. This section is an extremely abbreviated form of the argument in Mary Anne
Case, Slavery in the Other Domestic Relations, Panel Address during the University of
Chicago-Loyola University Law School Symposium: Slavery, Abolition, and Human
Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Thirteenth Amendment (Apr. 18, 2009)
(transcript on file with author). In prior work, I have argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of sex equality, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is a
fundamental commitment of the United States which it was “incumbent on government to
follow-through on . . . in its necessary interventions into the family and the private sphere,
such as its custody and adoption decisions.” Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism
as an Individual and Constitutional Commitment, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L.
549, 561 (2011). I distinguished in that work between fundamentalism (defined as an
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workers, one might nevertheless begin with the Thirteenth
Amendment. As the Supreme Court recognized in Frontiero,
“throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in
our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks
45
under the pre-Civil War slave codes.” In addition to the legal
46
laws, ratified by the
restrictions enumerated in Frontiero,
47
Supreme Court in cases from Bradwell v. Illinois through
48
Goesaert v. Cleary, had also disabled women from pursuing
many forms of paid employment. Of course, many legal
disabilities were those of married women, but just as a case like
49
Dred Scott extended the disabilities of slaves to blacks in general,
so a case like Bradwell, with the concurrence of Justice Bradley,
50
extended the disabilities of married women to women in general.
inability to compromise) and perfectionism (defined as a willingness to impose). Id. at 551.
My analysis here shows that one way of interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment is as a
perfectionist requirement of government intervention to prevent extreme forms of
submission by wives and daughters to husbands and fathers. This more perfectionist
approach would likely involve more active government intrusions into intact families (i.e.
those not already before the courts because of disputes over, for example, custody) to
combat unequal treatment on the basis of sex, even if stops short of what is now treated as
abuse.
45. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
46. See id. (“Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit
in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to
hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children”).
47. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (holding that Illinois could exclude women
categorically from the practice of law).
48. 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (upholding a law precluding all women other than the
wife and daughter of a bar’s owner from tending bar notwithstanding the possibility that
“the real impulse behind this legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to
try to monopolize the calling”).
49. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405, 407 (1856) (holding that “neither the
class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had
become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people”: they were, instead,
an “inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges
but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them”).
50. Bradwell 83 U.S. at 141-2 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) ( “It is true that many
women are unmarried and not affected by any of the duties, complications, and
incapacities arising out of the married state, but these are exceptions to the general rule. .
. . And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and
cannot be based upon exceptional cases.”). Cf. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan
(May 26. 1776), available at http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/ADMS-06-04-020091 (“Government cannot accommodate itself to every particular Case, as it happens, nor
to the Circumstances of particular Persons. It must establish general, comprehensive
Regulations for Cases and Persons. The only Question is, which general Rule, will
accommodate most Cases and most Persons.”) As I have previously argued, the core of
our current constitutional law of sex discrimination, for which Bradley’s opinion in
Bradwell serves as a negative precedent, is precisely that when it comes to sex “‘the rules
of civil society’ not only can but ‘must be adapted to . . . exceptional cases.’” See Mary
Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination
Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1471 (2000).
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Focusing on the “especially harsh forms of labor control” 51
women are subjected to, not only in the labor market, but also in
the household, reinforces the notion that slavery is one of the
domestic relations and invites a focus on two of the others—
husband and wife and father and daughter. Feminists such as
Elizabeth Cady Stanton argued that “[a]ccording to man’s idea,
as set forth in his creed and codes, marriage is a condition of
52
slavery.” One need not accept this argument categorically and
argue, contrary to the views of its framers, that all marital and
filial relations are called into question by the Thirteenth
Amendment to make the case that some are. Thus, in the same
way as the parent-child relationship is not enough to save the
master-slave relationship between a white man and his child by a
black slave, so neither a wife’s slave-like submission to her
53
husband nor a daughter’s to her father should be free from legal
scrutiny.
Unique textual features of the Thirteenth Amendment come
into play here: The Amendment bans slavery categorically,
whether voluntary on the part of the slave or not.
And, in declaring that “neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude . . . shall exist within the United States,” the
Amendment’s relationship to state action has two distinctive
features—not only does the Amendment reach beyond
governmental action to private action, it also requires the state to
act. The Amendment puts the state under an obligation to
eradicate slavery, creating, extraordinarily under U.S. law, a
positive constitutional right. As scholars have suggested, the
Thirteenth Amendment therefore can be seen to have
implications for the government’s obligations toward children

51. James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional
Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1500-01 (2010) (“ In addition to race,
sex might play an important role in Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence. . . . The relation
of sex to labor rights is complicated by the ideology of separate spheres, the unpaid
character of women’s work in the home, and the problem of uncompensated reproductive
labor . . . Women, like members of subordinate racially defined groups, often tend to be
targeted for especially harsh forms of labor control”).
52. Quoted in AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR,
MARRIAGE AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 176 (1998).
53. See, e.g., Spires v. Spires, 743 A.2d 186, 192 (D.C. 1999) (Schweib, J. concurring)
(“[A] ‘contract’ such as the one between these parties, which formalizes and seeks to
legitimize absolute male domination and female subordination within the marital
relationship, is against the public policy of this jurisdiction. It may not be enforced in our
courts, nor can it be permitted to affect adversely the rights of the oppressed wife or her
children. . . . [T]he parties’ now-defunct marriage made Mrs. Spires her former husband’s
partner, not his slave.”).
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abused by their parents 54 and wives abused by their husbands 55 as
well as for the authorized scope of government action with respect
56
to women and girls.
Given that the Thirteenth Amendment’s framers viewed
57
slavery and polygamy as “twin relics of barbarism,” a
particularly apt situation in which to invoke the Amendment
might be in quest of a remedy more effective than hitherto offered
under state law to the underage plural wives and other children of
the Fundamentalist Church of the Latter Day Saints (FLDS),
whom the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
tried unsuccessfully in 2008 to remove from their families on the
58
Yearning for Zion ranch. Accounts by those who have escaped
the FLDS tell of girls “treated like an indentured servant, forc[ed]
to do all the cooking, cleaning and babysitting,” being denied
education, put at risk of physical violence and sexual assault,
“condemned to a life of virtual slavery,” and taught that “[a]
woman’s role is to be obedient without question to her
59
husband.”
54. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A
Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1377 (1992)
(arguing that “[w]hen the child’s interests are utterly disregarded” as Joshua DeShaney’s
were by his father “the child is in effect being treated as a possession, as a chattel—as a
slave” and the state is under a Thirteenth Amendment duty to act).
55. See, e.g., Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary
Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207 (1992) (arguing
that both civil and criminal constitutional claims could be brought against some batterers
who hold their victims in what amounts to involuntary servitude).
56. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1942 (2012) (“When abortion is prohibited, the
state is doing what it was doing when it enslaved women before the Civil War”);
Marcellene Elizabeth Hearn, Comment, A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence
Against Women Act, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (1988) (arguing that the Thirteenth
Amendment could provide the constitutional support the Supreme Court held that the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not provide for a
federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence).
57. See Republican Platform of 1856, available at http://www.ushistory.org
/gop/convention_1856republicanplatform.htm (“[I]t is both the right and the imperative
duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of barbarism—Polygamy,
and Slavery.”)
58. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. May 22,
2008) (finding that there had been no proof of risk of imminent physical harm to the
children, despite the concern of the Department that “due to the ‘pervasive belief system’
of the FLDS, the male children are groomed to be perpetrators of sexual abuse and the
girls are raised to be victims of sexual abuse”).
59. See Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier Between
Government and Family Responsibility for Children, 2009 UTAH L.REV. 381, 404-05
(quoting accounts of former members of the FLDS). As I have previously argued,
convicting some of the patriarchs of the FLDS of rape after the fact does little to protect
the girls who are their victims and a failure to protect these girls is a failure to offer equal
protection on grounds of sex. Id. at 401-06.
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THE LESSONS OF ORIGINALISM FOR FEMINISM AND
OF FEMINISM FOR ORIGINALISM
I have used the specific possibility of making legal arguments
against the slavelike submission of wives and daughters
notwithstanding the claims of the framers of the Thirteenth
Amendment that their intent was to leave in place the law of
domestic relations other than master and slave to show what
creative opportunities not inconsistent with originalism there
might be for feminist legal arguments. But unquestionably the
broader conclusion one must reach after examining the history of
the framing of both the original constitution and the post-Civil
War Amendments is that no version of original meaning—not the
specific intent of the Framers, not the general understanding of
the ratifiers, not the original public meaning, not the original
expected application, nor any other version of what originalists
may say they look to in order to determine the scope of
constitutional provisions holds much promise for yielding what
Abigail Adams demanded of John—a constitutionally mandated
code of laws more “generous and favorable” to women than the
one the Framers inherited. As Ward Farnsworth carefully
demonstrated, even the heroic efforts scholars have devoted to an
60
originalist defense of racial desegregation would, if turned to
questions of originalism and women’s rights, lead “to the
conclusion that nineteenth-century laws imposing serious legal
61
disabilities on women were constitutional.”
Scholars, lawyers, and activists have had a variety of
responses to this well-nigh inescapable conclusion. Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, whose litigation on behalf of the ACLU Women’s
Right’s Project made the constitutional law of sex discrimination
what it is today, frankly acknowledged early on:
Boldly dynamic interpretation, departing radically from the
original understanding, is required to tie to the fourteenth
amendment’s equal protection clause a command that
government treat men and women as individuals equal in
62
rights, responsibilities, and opportunities.

60. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions,
81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995).
61. Ward Farnsworth, Women Under Reconstruction: The Congressional
Understanding, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2000).
62. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights
Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 161.
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Despite Ginsburg’s success in entrenching a constitutional
63
case law of sex equality, some have concluded it continues to be
crucial to ratify an Equal Rights Amendment so as to lay a
groundwork for constitutional sex equality even originalists
64
would have to acknowledge. Many supportive of claims for
women’s rights and sex equality have argued in various ways that
the Nineteenth Amendment, read correctly and broadly, can be
used to ground claims for sex equality under the Constitution,
including but not limited to those already accepted by the
65
Supreme Court.
Giving feminists cause for worry, however, some of the most
prominent self-proclaimed originalists have announced
themselves perfectly comfortable with the conclusion that the
Constitution does not prohibit sex discrimination. Most notorious

63. She was later able to ratify this constitutional case law as a Justice in United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), and see it endorsed by Chief Justice Rehnquist as
sufficient to ground Section 5 power in Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721
(2003).
64. Cf. Mike Rappaport, Originalism and Sex Discrimination VI: Originalism,
Nonoriginalism, and the (Possible) Failure of the Constitution to Protect Against Sex Based
Distinctions, The Originalism Blog (Dec. 23, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://originalismblog.
typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2011/12/originalism-and-sex-discrimination-vioriginalism-nonoriginalism-and-the-possible-failure-of-the-con.html. (“If the original
meaning of the Constitution does not protect against sex discrimination, it is not the fault
of originalism. Instead, it is the fault of nonoriginalism. The reason is that there seems little
doubt that an equal rights amendment would have passed in the 1970s if not for
nonoriginalism”).
65. See, e.g., W. William Hodes, Women and the Constitution: Some Legal History
and a New Approach to the Nineteenth Amendment, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 26 (1970); Akhil
Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465 (1995); Reva
B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the
Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002); Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism
and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-15 (2011). Calbresi and Rickert also make a
Fourteenth Amendment argument on behalf of women’s equality, but it appears to be a
textualist, rather than an originalist argument: They acknowledge that the Amendment’s
Framers and their contemporaries clearly did not see the Amendment as calling laws
restrictive of women into question, but, they assert this was because of “unenacted factual
beliefs about the capabilities of women” and “[w]e now know more about women’s
capabilities than the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers knew.” Id. at 9. To the extent this
really is a claim about the evolution of knowledge of ordinary facts, not the evolution of
political judgements, I see no evidence to support it. The Framers did not doubt their wives
and daughters abilities as a matter of fact—they were in far greater doubt of the abilities
of the blacks they did enfranchise, which is what allowed Elizabeth Cady Stanton to make,
as early as 1848, the unsuccessful arguments for which she is castigated today about the
mistake of enfranchising uneducated immigrant men before educated WASP women. See
e.g., Address by Elizabeth Cady Stanton on Woman’s Rights, September 1848, available at
http://ecssba.rutgers.edu/docs/ecswoman1.html (“[T]o have the rights of drunkards, idiots,
horse-racing, rum selling rowdies, ignorant foreigners, and silly boys fully recognised,
whilst we ourselves are thrust out from all the rights that belong to citizens—it is too grossly
insulting to the dignity of woman to be longer quietly submitted to”).
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among them is Justice Scalia. When interviewer Calvin Massey
put it to him that:
In 1868, when the 39th Congress was debating and ultimately
proposing the 14th Amendment, I don’t think anybody would
have thought that equal protection applied to sex
discrimination, or certainly not to sexual orientation. So does
that mean that we’ve gone off in error by applying the 14th
66
Amendment to both?

Scalia responded:
Yes, yes. Sorry, to tell you that. . . . But, you know, if indeed
the current society has come to different views, that’s fine. You
do not need the Constitution to reflect the wishes of the current
society. Certainly the Constitution does not require
discrimination on the basis of sex. The only issue is whether it
prohibits it. It doesn’t. Nobody ever thought that that’s what it
meant. Nobody ever voted for that. If the current society wants
to outlaw discrimination by sex, hey we have things called
legislatures, and they enact things called laws. You don’t need
a constitution to keep things up-to-date. All you need is a
67
legislature and a ballot box.
66. The Originalist: Justice Antonin Scalia, CALIFORNIA LAWYER (Jan. 2011),
http://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?eid=913358 (interview with Calvin Massey).
67. Id. Even Scalia appears to lack the courage of his convictions, because, when
questioned about precisely these statements by Senator Dianne Feinstein, who read them
back to him verbatim, he insisted that he “was speaking of Title VII and laws that prohibit
private discrimination. The 14th Amendment says nothing about private discrimination,
only discrimination by Government.” Considering the Role of Judges Under the
Constitution of the United States: Hearing Before the Committee on Judiciary of the Senate
of the United States, 112th Cong. 37 (Oct. 5, 2011), at 20. Whatever else may be unclear
about Scalia’s views, he was clearly speaking of the Constitution, not Title VII, in his
California Lawyer interview. More recently, when questioned by Jennifer Senior, he again
abjured:
What about sex discrimination? Do you think the Fourteenth Amendment covers
it?
Of course it covers it! No, you can’t treat women differently, give them higher
criminal sentences. Of course not.
A couple of years ago, I think you told California Lawyer something different.
What I was referring to is: The issue is not whether it prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sex. Of course it does. The issue is, What is discrimination? If there’s
a reasonable basis for not letting women do something like going into combat or
whatnot . . .
Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 7, 2013. Of course, in
many states for much of U.S. history, women were indeed treated differently in criminal
sentencing and given higher sentences, for example under statutes that provided
indeterminate sentences for them, and shorter fixed sentences for men. See e.g., Paula C.
Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of African American Women in Crime
and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 26-29 (1995) (citing examples of unequal
sentencing laws and noting that “[c]ourts justified legislative distinctions which imposed
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I must confess that I approach the question of the effect of an
originalist approach like Scalia’s on constitutional interpretation
of protections against laws that discriminate on the basis of sex in
Beardian terms, motivated by a combination of “interests [I]
underst[and] and fe[el] in concrete, definite form through [my]
own personal experience” and “the guidance of abstract
68
principles of political science.” Richard Fallon has expressed
concern that
an originalist theory that . . . left the contemporary
constitutionality of paper money and Social Security hostage to
the outcome of historical tests that they might not pass—
despite the devastating consequences that their invalidation
would entail—might rate high on the scale of being principled,
but it also would be morally, politically, and legally
69
irresponsible.

I am much more worried about an originalist theory that will
find coverture and the elimination of women from public life
constitutional. After all, I am a single woman, licensed to practice
law, gainfully employed, with liberty and equality that nonoriginalist constitutional case law, (and not any version of
originalism) has guaranteed me, and a concern that the
overturning of precedent by a principled originalist might have
“devastating consequences” for me personally and the “abstract
principles” I am guided by and committed to. In past work, I have
70
called these abstract principles “feminist fundamentalism,”
which I have defined as an uncompromising commitment to the
equality of the sexes, further specified in my own particular case
(in terms taken, as it happens, from the current U.S. constitutional
case law) as an uncompromising opposition to “fixed notions
71
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.” The
substantive rules that were in place and reaffirmed by the Framers
of both the original Constitution and the post-Civil War
Amendments with respect to women are, for both personal and
ideological reasons, rules I don’t want to live with.

longer sentences on women than men as reasonable in view of the state’s purpose of
providing more effective rehabilitation for women”).
68. See supra note 1.
69. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are
They Rationalizations for Conservatism? 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 20 (2011).
70. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism as an Individual and
Constitutional Commitment, supra note 43.
71. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
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It was because of these commitments and concerns that, in
2010, I accepted the invitation of the Federalist Society to appear
as the only woman with a speaking part in their national
symposium, Originalism 2.0. As I explained to the Federalists, I
understood quite well why, if the topic was originalism, they really
needed a woman to speak, even if to find one they had to reach
out to someone like me who was neither a Federalist nor a fellow
traveler of Federalists, who had not in the past either written,
spoken, or even thought very hard about originalism, and who had
been spending almost as much time with the canon law as with the
U.S. Constitution in the preceding year. The question I had for
the Federalists was, having defended Brown on originalist
grounds, do you also defend Frontiero and its progeny, and, if you
cannot, what constitutional brake is there to a return to coverture
and the rest of the “masculine systems” John Adams and his
fellow Framers refused to repeal? The question the Federalist
Society asked me to address was, “Is originalism a rationalization
for conservatism or a principled theory of interpretation?”
I began my remarks by agreeing with Richard Fallon that
even if originalism can be a principled theory of interpretation this
does not mean it is indeed employed as such or that it should be.
I illustrated this point with an analogy to astrology, noting that,
several decades ago, when I was a practicing lawyer in New York,
I was in a reading group with, among others, a professional
astrologist, who would try her best, whatever book we were
reading, to chart the horoscopes of the characters. She was a very
serious and principled astrologist, but frustrated in her efforts
because there was not usually enough relevant information in the
books to chart the characters in a way to get a determinate
principled result. That, mutatis mutandis, is also a problem with
originalism. Additionally, however, it does not seem we are
engaged in principled originalism any more than people are
engaging in principled astrology when they do not look to a
careful and specified charting of their own signs and the signs of
the people around them, but turn to the Daily News or the New
York Post, look for their sun sign, read a simple, single little
phrase that’s billed as their fortune for the day, and take it
72
seriously.
72. Cf. Mary Anne Case, Are Plain Hamburgers Now Unconstitutional? The Equal
Protection Component of Bush v. Gore as a Chapter in the History of Ideas About Law, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 55, n.3 (2003) (observing that if the “Supreme Court had determined a
winner in Bush v Gore, not by constitutional adjudication, but by divination, as the ancients
often claimed to select leaders. . . . it might be noteworthy whether the decision was framed
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In the very limited time that I had to prepare to address the
Federalist Society, I tried to educate myself as to what role
originalism had actually played in Supreme Court cases. I was
surprised to learn, when I looked for basic descriptive empirical
work that systematically examined U.S. Supreme Court cases in
which originalist arguments could have been employed to see if
they were employed, and if so, by whom, and how often these
arguments were outcome-determinative, that such work did not
73
appear to have been done. There is a great deal of published
work available on the theory of originalism, but apparently very
little on the practice. I think this undercuts the notion that
originalism is being applied in any kind of principled fashion, and
it is not clear to me that to attempt to apply it in a principled
fashion would make any more sense than to apply astrology in a
principled fashion. Perhaps it can be done, but we do not do it,
and, as Fallon cogently argues, we may be right not to. Among the
many reasons not to is that delving into eighteenth-century
archives, like delving into the motions of the planets, seems an
enterprise too far removed from the subjects directly at issue in
constitutional cases to be geared toward generating either
74
productive conversation or helpful insights.
Even more instructive than an analogy to astrology, and less
susceptible of being dismissed as flip, is the analogy of originalism
to biblical literalism. It does seem to make much more sense to
want to interpret a text according to its original intent if you think
75
that the original intent is the intent of God. And it is certainly

by reference to astrology rather than palmistry or the reading of entrails, although it is
possible to choose any of these techniques in good or bad faith, to apply any one well or
badly by its own terms, and to make a choice of technique consistent with or divergent
from one’s usual choices”).
73. It is my understanding that my colleague Eric Posner, together with Lee Epstein,
has recently embarked on such empirical work and I look forward to reading it when it is
complete. See generally FRANK CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013)
(evaluating the use and absence of originalist arguments in Supreme Court opinions).
74. The same cannot, by contrast, be as readily said of, for example, either a Ronald
Dworkin-style moral reading of the Constitution or a Richard Posner-style economic
analysis of law, whatever other limitations these approaches may have. Cf. Justice Alito in
the oral argument of Brown v. EMA, 2010 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 57, at *14 (“I think what
Justice Scalia wants to know is what James Madison thought about video games. . . . Did
he enjoy them?”) Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131
S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (No. 08-1448), 2010 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 57. Even asking, as Scalia insisted
he was, “what James Madison thought about violence,” id., risks turning the discussion
away from legal reasoning toward antiquarianism the more seriously it is taken not merely
as a relevant but as the outcome determinative question.
75. Cf. BEARD, WOMEN AS FORCE IN HISTORY, supra note 14, at 90 (“Jefferson was
scarcely exaggerating when he wrote long after the Commentaries appeared: ‘The opinion

8 - THE LADIES, FORGET ABOUT THEM (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

7/18/2014 9:45 AM

THE LADIES? FORGET ABOUT THEM.

451

the case that people take biblical literalism much more seriously;
they are much more interested in getting it right and doing the
necessary work, whatever in their faith tradition that work is seen
to be, to see what original intent might be.
Much has already been said and much still remains to be said
about the connections between methods for the interpretation of
constitutional and biblical texts. Both constitutional and biblical
texts are susceptible to tensions between clause bound and
holistic interpretations. Both present the challenge of interpreting
as a coherent whole a document theoretically propounded by a
single authoritative voice—whether that of God or We The
People—but actually written by multiple authors over a period of
centuries. Reading together the first and the second creation story
in Genesis or the Old and the New Testaments presents
challenges akin to reading together the original constitution, the
76
Bill of Rights and the post-Civil War Amendments. It is
noteworthy to me as a comparativist that the United States, with
a dominant Protestant tradition of biblical exegesis overshadowed
by claims of biblical inerrancy, is virtually the only country to take
originalism seriously as a method of constitutional
77
interpretation. Strict textualism is akin to sola scriptura. And in
France, with its Catholic heritage, Portalis, one of the principal
authors of the Napoleonic Civil Code, endorsed an interpretive
78
method far closer to living constitutionalism than originalism.
According to David Strauss, pursuing the analogy between
originalism and Protestantism cuts against the position that
originalism is conservative:
seems to be that Blackstone is to us what the Alcoran is to the Mahometans, that
everything which is necessary is in him, and what is not in him is not necessary’”).
76. For an example of interpretive problems posed for originalists in the writing of
the present day Constitution by multiple authors in multiple centuries, see Jamal Greene,
Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 979 (2012) (arguing that,
contrary to common practice, “[a]n originalist who believes that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated against state governments some or all of the rights protected by
the Bill of Rights should, in adjudicating cases under incorporated provisions, be
concerned primarily (if not exclusively) with determining how the generation that ratified
that amendment,” rather than the eighteenth-century Framers of the Bill of Rights,
“understood the scope and substance of the rights at issue”).
77. See, e.g., Jill Lepore, The Commandments: The Constitution and Its Worshippers,
NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2011, at 70, 76 (“Originalism, which has no purchase anywhere but
here, has a natural affinity with some varieties of Protestantism, and the United States
differs from all other Western democracies in the far greater proportion of its citizens who
believe in the literal truth of the Bible”).
78. See Preliminary Address on the First Draft of the Civil Code Presented in the
Year IX by Messrs. Portalis, Tronchet, Bigotpréameneu and Maleville, Member of the
Government-Appointed Commission, (1801), translated and available at http://www.just
ice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/ilp-pji/code/index.html.
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Perhaps the greatest of all originalist movements—the
Protestant Reformation . . . attacked the existing order, the
existing tradition, as corrupt and wrongheaded and called for a
return to the text and the original understandings. Originalism
is, therefore, in its essence, a destructive creed. It does not
provide answers. It gives you a way of challenging the received
wisdom. It is a way of getting rid of things. When you want to
rebuild, when you want to start building up a doctrine,
79
originalism does not really help you; it is too indeterminate.

Focusing on their approaches to women, let me pursue
instead an analogy between American originalism and
Anglicanism that points up originalism’s methodological as well
80
as substantive conservative tendencies.
Keith Whittington has argued that the most prominent
normative justification for originalism grounds it “in a theory of
popular sovereignty and democratic lawmaking. . . . One should
be an originalist because the Constitution was authorized by
democratically elected delegates who had legitimate authority to
81
ratify the constitutional text.”
Among the earliest prescriptions for democratic lawmaking
is a Latin maxim that had its origins in the Roman law of
guardianship, migrated into the canon law, and expanded into
political theory as early as the Middle Ages. It goes by the Latin
tag quod omnes tangit, short for either Quod omnes tangit, ab
omnibus approbetur or alternatively Quod omnes tangit omnibus
tractari et approbari debet, meaning, “What touches all must be
82
[debated and] approved by all.” Some see this maxim behind the
French king’s invocation of the Estates General, which, as noted
above, did include women in each of the three estates from the
14th century on.

79. David Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 34 HARV. L. &
PUB. POLICY 137, 144 (2011). It should go without saying that if Strauss is right I have
much to fear from an application of originalism to the sex equality precedents I hold dear.
80. The analogy I am pursuing here applies to originalism in the American context,
but would not extend to a constitution in whose framing and ratification women were fully
included. Cf. Kerri A. Froc, Is Originalism Bad for Women? The Curious Case of Canada’s
“Equal Rights Amendment” (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (considering an
originalist approach to Sec. 28 of the Canadian Constitution that takes full account of the
views of its “feminist framers”).
81. Keith E. Whittingon, Is Originalism Too Conservative? 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 29, 39 (2011). Fallon, Whittington, and I were asked to address the same topic by
the Federalist Society.
82. See, e.g., GAINES POST, A Romano-Canonical Maxim, Quod omnes tangit, in
Bracton and in Early Parliaments, in STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL THOUGHT: PUBLIC
LAW AND THE STATE, 1100-1322 163 (1964).
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Shortly before I spoke to the Federalist Society, I had the
occasion to examine this maxim in the context of sex and gender
83
in comments I was asked to write on Archbishop of Canterbury
Rowan Williams’s discussion of the potential schism in the
Anglican Church concerning issues, not only of homosexuality,
but also the ordination of women as bishops. The Archbishop
invoked this maxim of canon law, saying that, because “what
affects the communion of all should be decided by all,” therefore
the Anglican Communion has to move slowly with respect to
84
change; it has to discuss and debate it.
Given the historical exclusion of women from
decisionmaking in the Church and the historical exclusion of
women from decisionmaking in the Republic, to require them, at
the moment of their inclusion, to expend energy and political
capital on effecting legislative repeal or constitutional
amendment of every aspect of the legal system that is already
stacked against them is to perpetuate their disadvantage when
compared to those whose interests have already been taken into
account because they could and did participate in the framing of
the system. To use a maxim like quod omnes tangit or an
interpretive methodology like originalism as a brake on change—
as a rationale for conservatism—leaves out those people who
were not able to be part of the original process of popular
85
sovereignty and democratic decisionmaking.
Were women a part of omnes in the framing of canon law?
Were they a part of We the People in any meaningful sense in the
framing of the original Constitution and post-Civil War
86
Amendments? If Abigail Adams’s insistence that the Framers
“remember the ladies” had no other effect on John, it may at least
83. Mary Anne Case, Homosexuality and the Anglican Debate, THE IMMANENT
FRAME, blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2009/08/04/homosexuality-and-the-anglican-debate/.
84. Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Communion, Covenant and Our
Anglican Future, THE GUARDIAN, Monday, 27 July 2009, http://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/27/rowan-williams-anglican-communion.
85. Thus, that women are currently included in democratic deliberation does not by
itself remedy their prior exclusion. Nor is it determinative that, for example, the laws of
coverture in the United States were never constitutionally mandated but were subjects of
ordinary legislation. At the time women received the vote, they inherited a system of laws
unfavorable to them, which served as a built-in headwind. To effect the repeal of such laws
through the ordinary legislative processes would require an expenditure of effort and
political capital not required of those groups whose interests were fully represented in the
Constitution’s framing.
86. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: “In Order To Get Beyond Racism, We
Must First Take Account of Race,” 1979 WASH. U .L.Q. 147, 152 (“My father came to this
country when he was a teenager. Not only had he never profited from the sweat of any
black man’s brow, I don’t think he had ever seen a black man.”).
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have made him consider this question. When, in the spring of
1776, James Sullivan, invoking quod omnes tangit, urged the
elimination of property qualifications for voting, John Adams
responded, with Abigail’s urging fresh in his mind:
It is certain in Theory, that the only moral Foundation of
Government is the Consent of the People. But to what an
Extent Shall We carry this Principle? Shall We Say, that every
Individual of the Community, old and young, male and female,
as well as rich and poor, must consent, expressly to every Act
of Legislation? No, you will Say. This is impossible. . . .Whence
arises the Right of the Men to govern Women, without their
87
Consent?

Unfortunately, the conclusion John Adams draws from this
is that it would be “dangerous to attemp[t] to alter the
Qualifications of Voters” in any way because “[t]here will be no
88
End of it. New Claims will arise. Women will demand a Vote.”
Adams argued that
The Same Reasoning, which will induce you to admit all Men,
who have no Property, to vote, with those who have, for those
Laws, which affect the Person will prove that you ought to
admit Women . . . for generally Speaking, Women. . . have as
good Judgment, and as independent Minds as those Men who
are wholly destitute of Property: these last being to all Intents
and Purposes as much dependent upon others, who will please
to feed, cloath, and employ them, as Women are upon their
89
Husbands. . . .

This line of analysis suggests that, for Beardian reasons, John
Adams was deaf to his wife’s principal claim, since it was precisely
the legally mandated dependence of wives on “the unlimited
90
power . . . of the husbands” it was Abigail’s chief purpose to see
dissolved in a new code of laws. Instead, for John Adams, two
wrongs seem to have made a right—women’s legally mandated
dependence helped justify their exclusion from political power,

87. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan, supra note 50. Sullivan had written
to Gerry, in a letter transmitted to Adams, “Every member of Society has a Right to give
his Consent to the Laws of the Community or he owes no Obedience to them.” Id. Adams
drafted his response within two months of having been prompted by his wife to “remember
the ladies.”
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams, supra note 4, at 121.
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rather than their exclusion from political power calling into
91
question their legally mandated dependence.
Abigail Adams’s main concern was not voting rights, but a
substantive code of law more just and favorable to women. She
did, however, tell John that, should the laws not improve, the
ladies “are determined to foment a rebellion, and will not hold
ourselves bound by any laws in which we have no voice or
92
representation.” Objection on behalf of women to their
93
exclusion from democratic deliberation has a very long history,
as does the claim that they should not be bound by unequal laws
from whose framing they were excluded. There is actually a tale
in Boccaccio’s The Decameron in which a woman named
Madonna Filippa is taken in adultery and serves very effectively
as her own lawyer, making good use of quod omnes tangit before
the magistrate and the men and women of her town. Confessing
to adultery, she adds,
I am certain you know that the laws should be equal for both
sexes and made with the consent of those who are to obey
them. That is not so in this case, for it only touches us poor
women, who are yet able to satisfy many more than men can;
moreover, no woman gave her consent or was even consulted
when this law was passed. And so it may reasonably be called

91. Compare John Adams’s proposed response to the disenfranchisement of
propertyless men, in his letter to Sullivan, supra note 50. (“Power always follows
Property. . . . The only possible Way then of preserving the Ballance of Power on the side
of equal Liberty and public Virtue, is to make the Acquisition of Land easy to every
Member of Society: to make a Division of the Land into Small Quantities, So that the
Multitude may be possessed of landed Estates. If the Multitude is possessed of the Ballance
of real Estate, the Multitude will have the Ballance of Power, and in that Case the
Multitude will take Care of the Liberty, Virtue, and Interest of the Multitude in all Acts of
Government”).
92. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams, supra note 4, at 121. While she
repeats that she “threat[ened] fomenting a Rebellion in case we were not consider[ed], and
assured him we would not hold ourselves bound by any Laws in which we had neither a
voice, nor representation” in her letter to Mercy Otis Warren detailing John Adams’s
“sau[c]y” response to her “List of Female Grievances,” Abigail Adams also tells Warren,
“I think I will get you to join me in a petition to Congress,” a far less revolutionary
approach.” See Letter from Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, supra note 8.
93. Consider Ockham’s Dialogus, in which Magister repeatedly suggests women are
part of omnes. See, e.g., WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DIALOGUS, Book 6, Chapter LXXXV in
AUCTORES BRITANNICI MEDII AEVI, (John Kilcullen et al., eds.), available at
https://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus/ockdial.html. Kenneth Pennington in A Note to
Decameron 6.7: The Wit of Madonna Filippa, 52 SPECULUM 902, 903-04 (1977), asserts first
that the maxim’s “logic was never extended to women in the Middle Ages,” then goes on
to acknowledge that Ockham’s “magister declares that women should not be excluded
from a general council, especially in matters of faith ‘quae omnes tangit’” but observes that
“the student responds that he cannot take such an irrational argument seriously” and
concludes that “Ockham meant to amuse his readers with the irony of this passage.”
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an inequitable law. . . . The case concerning so well known a
lady had attracted to the Court almost all the inhabitants of
Prato . . . [who] with one voice shouted that the lady was right
and spoke well. Before they separated, with the judge’s consent
94
they modified this cruel law.

Let me conclude that it is long past time to adopt the approach of
Madonna Filippa and of Abigail Adams in considering whether
originalism makes sense in general, but particularly from the
perspective of women, their rights and liberties.

94.
1969).

BOCCACCIO, 2 DECAMERON, Day 6. Tale 7, at 33-35 (Richard Aldington trans.,

